ROOT CAUSE: Tier 2 used 'git stash' during the cruft_elimination_20260627
track execution and corrupted the user's in-progress files. The user
explicitly stated: 'if an agent fucks up, their tendency to want to revert
is not correct and instead they must live with the timeline and just do
corrections with a new commit. They can grab artifacts, code, etc, from
old commits but they cannot reset to that.'
This commit adds HARD BANs on git stash* and git clean -fd* at 3 layers
(per the existing 3-layer defense model documented in
conductor/tier2/agents/tier2-autonomous.md):
LAYER 1: AGENTS.md
- Added new HARD BAN: 'git stash* (any form: git stash, git stash pop,
git stash apply, git stash drop, git stash clear) is FORBIDDEN.
Stashing inverts the safety net of the working tree'
LAYER 2: conductor/tier2/opencode.json.fragment (Tier 2 autonomous)
- Added 'git stash*', 'git stash pop*', 'git stash apply*',
'git stash drop*', 'git stash clear*', 'git clean -fd*', 'git clean -fdx*'
to BOTH the top-level permission.bash deny list AND the
agent.tier2-autonomous.permission.bash deny list
- Also added 'git revert*' (was missing from fragment; already banned in prompt)
- These are now HARD DENIED at the OpenCode permission layer; the agent
cannot run them even if it tries
LAYER 3: conductor/tier2/agents/tier2-autonomous.md
- Added 'git stash* (any form)' to the Hard Bans list
- Added 'THE TIMELINE-IS-IMMUTABLE PRINCIPLE' section spelling out
exactly what to do when you fuck up:
- When you make a wrong commit, write a NEW commit that fixes it
- The git history is immutable on this branch
- You CAN grab artifacts from old commits via 'git show <sha>:<path> > <new-path>'
- You CANNOT reset the branch HEAD to an old commit
- 'git revert', 'git reset --hard', 'git reset --soft', 'git stash' are
all attempts to rewrite history and BANNED
- Correct pattern: pause, read the actual file, write a forward
corrective commit with a commit message that explains the fix
This addresses the root cause of the 2026-06-27 cruft_elimination
corruption. Future Tier 2 autonomous runs will be blocked from running
git stash* at 2 layers (OpenCode permission deny + Tier 2 prompt hard
ban list) and reminded at the agent-prompt layer (THE TIMELINE-IS-
IMMUTABLE PRINCIPLE section).
Follow-up to the 'NEVER USE APPDATA' directive. The agent kept
trying to use \C:\Users\Ed\AppData\Local\Temp / \C:\Users\Ed\AppData\Local\Temp / %TEMP% / %TMP% — the previous
deny rule (*AppData\\\\* and *AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*) only matched
the literal expanded path, not the env-var form. The agent would
self-block based on its own interpretation of the rule, but it still
TRIED before self-blocking (the 'fucking tired of it fucking with
AppData' complaint).
Fix:
1. opencode.json.fragment: add bash deny patterns matched against
the LITERAL command string (before shell expansion):
*\C:\Users\Ed\AppData\Local\Temp* - PowerShell env var (the form the agent tried)
*\C:\Users\Ed\AppData\Local\Temp* - PowerShell env var
*%TEMP%* - cmd env var
*%TMP%* - cmd env var
*GetTempPath* - .NET API
*gettempdir* - Python tempfile module
*mkstemp* - Python tempfile.mkstemp
Applied to BOTH the top-level permission.bash (for default agents)
and the tier2-autonomous agent's permission.bash.
2. conductor/tier2/agents/tier2-autonomous.md: rewrite the Temp
files section to explicitly list ALL forbidden literals and
reiterate 'every one of those literal command strings is denied
at the bash level'. Updated changelog note.
3. conductor/tier2/commands/tier-2-auto-execute.md: same.
4. tests/test_tier2_slash_command_spec.py: extend
test_config_fragment_denies_temp_writes to assert each of the 9
patterns in both the top-level and the agent's bash.
Verified: re-ran setup against the live clone. tier2 agent's bash
has 13 deny patterns (9 AppData/temp + 4 git). 37/37 default-on
tests pass.
Note: the user's prior commit (fix(tier2): remove AppData allow
rules from OpenCode permission JSON) already removed the AppData
allow rules from read/write and added the broader *AppData\\\\*
deny rule. This commit layers on top of that with the env-var-form
deny patterns.
Before:
- read/write allow rules for AppData/Local/manual_slop/tier2/ and
AppData/Local/manual_slop/tier2_failures/ existed in both the
top-level and the tier2-autonomous agent's permission blocks.
- Bash deny rules covered only AppData/Local/Temp/.
After:
- read/write allow only the Tier 2 clone (C:\\projects\\manual_slop_tier2\\**).
- Bash deny rules: *AppData\\* (broader) + *AppData\\Local\\Temp\\* (kept for clarity).
The broader *AppData\\* rule catches Local, LocalLow, Roaming, and any
other subdir, not just Temp. The narrower Temp rule is kept as a
self-documenting marker for the original 2026-06-17 regression.
Per the user's 2026-06-18 'NEVER USE APPDATA' directive.
Refs: conductor/tracks/tier2_no_appdata_20260618
The Tier 2 agent wrote audit_exception_handling.py output to
C:\\Users\\Ed\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\audit_initial.json via shell
redirection. This is OUTSIDE the sandbox allowlist (which is
C:\\projects\\manual_slop_tier2 + C:\\Users\\Ed\\AppData\\Local\\
manual_slop\\tier2 + C:\\Users\\Ed\\AppData\\Local\\manual_slop\\
tier2_failures). The OpenCode session-level guard fires the 'ask'
prompt for paths outside the project root, which has no answer in an
autonomous session, so ops halted mid-track.
Fix (3 layers):
1. opencode.json.fragment: add bash deny rule
'*AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*': 'deny' to BOTH the top-level
permission.bash (for default agents) and the tier2-autonomous
agent's permission.bash. The agent physically cannot run shell
commands that target the global Temp dir.
2. conductor/tier2/agents/tier2-autonomous.md: add 'Temp files'
convention telling the agent to use
C:\\Users\\Ed\\AppData\\Local\\manual_slop\\tier2\\ for scratch
/ audit-output / intermediate files, NOT %TEMP%.
3. conductor/tier2/commands/tier-2-auto-execute.md: same convention
in the slash command so the agent sees it at slash-command time.
Tests (default-on):
- test_agent_denies_temp_writes: agent prompt has the Temp deny in
frontmatter bash + the app-data dir note
- test_config_fragment_denies_temp_writes: both top-level and agent
bash have the deny rule
All 16 tier 2 slash command tests pass.
Also: cleaned up the leaked audit_initial.json + audit.json +
audit_after*.json from %TEMP% (they were leftovers from a prior
run). Re-ran setup against the live clone; opencode.json's agent
bash and top-level bash both have the deny rule.
The clone's opencode.json inherited the main repo's top-level 'model'
field (zai/glm-5) via 'git clone'. The tier2-autonomous agent has its
own 'model: minimax-coding-plan/MiniMax-M3' override, so the default
agent path was technically correct, but any other agent spawned without
an explicit model (or if the user manually switched to build/plan)
would have used zai/glm-5 instead of MiniMax-M3.
Fix:
1. Add top-level 'model: minimax-coding-plan/MiniMax-M3' to
conductor/tier2/opencode.json.fragment.
2. setup_tier2_clone.ps1 merge now overrides 'model' from the fragment
(was only overriding agent, permission, default_agent).
3. Added test_config_fragment_has_top_level_model (default-on) to
assert the fragment's model field.
4. Added test_setup_script_overrides_model (opt-in TIER2_SANDBOX_TESTS=1)
to assert the merge code.
All 17 tests pass (14 default-on + 3 opt-in).
Verified: re-ran setup against the live clone; opencode.json's
top-level 'model' is now minimax-coding-plan/MiniMax-M3.
Regression: a Tier 2 session was denied access to
C:\\projects\\manual_slop_tier2\\scripts\\run_tests_batched.py
with 'Allowed base directories are: gencpp, manual_slop'. The
tier2-autonomous agent had a correct permission.read allowlist, but
the top-level permission block (inherited from the main repo's
opencode.json via 'git clone') had no read/write keys, and OpenCode
uses the top-level for the default agent path. The agent's
permission.read was merged but apparently not enforced for the
default-agent access check.
Fix:
1. Add a top-level 'permission' block to
conductor/tier2/opencode.json.fragment with:
- permission.edit: 'deny' (default agents locked down)
- permission.read: deny *, allow sandbox clone + app-data dirs
- permission.write: same
- permission.bash: deny *, allowlist of read-only git commands +
uv run python scripts/{run_tests_batched.py,tier2/*} + basic
shell commands. git push/checkout/restore/reset remain denied.
2. Update setup_tier2_clone.ps1 to also patch the top-level
'permission' block (was only merging the tier2-autonomous agent
block). The script preserves the user's mcp, model, instructions,
watcher, and plugin settings from the inherited opencode.json.
3. Update test_tier2_slash_command_spec.py:
- Rename test_command_fetches_origin_main -> ..._master (we
changed the slash command on 2026-06-17).
- Add test_config_fragment_has_top_level_permission to assert
the new top-level permission block has the right deny-all +
allowlist shape.
The tier2-autonomous agent's permission block is unchanged; it
overrides the top-level for that agent's tool calls.
ed