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core/crypto/aes: Use NIST terminology for the IV

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This commit is contained in:
Yawning Angel
2024-08-10 18:32:37 +09:00
parent ac7f44b1b8
commit 708f053fe6
4 changed files with 40 additions and 40 deletions
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core/crypto/aes/aes_gcm.odin
+25 -25
View File
@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ import "core:crypto/_aes/ct64"
import "core:encoding/endian"
import "core:mem"
// GCM_NONCE_SIZE is the default size of the GCM nonce in bytes.
GCM_NONCE_SIZE :: 12
// GCM_NONCE_SIZE_MAX is the maximum size of the GCM nonce in bytes.
GCM_NONCE_SIZE_MAX :: 0x2000000000000000 // floor((2^64 - 1) / 8) bits
// GCM_IV_SIZE is the default size of the GCM IV in bytes.
GCM_IV_SIZE :: 12
// GCM_IV_SIZE_MAX is the maximum size of the GCM IV in bytes.
GCM_IV_SIZE_MAX :: 0x2000000000000000 // floor((2^64 - 1) / 8) bits
// GCM_TAG_SIZE is the size of a GCM tag in bytes.
GCM_TAG_SIZE :: _aes.GHASH_TAG_SIZE
@@ -32,13 +32,13 @@ init_gcm :: proc(ctx: ^Context_GCM, key: []byte, impl := Implementation.Hardware
}
// seal_gcm encrypts the plaintext and authenticates the aad and ciphertext,
// with the provided Context_GCM and nonce, stores the output in dst and tag.
// with the provided Context_GCM and iv, stores the output in dst and tag.
//
// dst and plaintext MUST alias exactly or not at all.
seal_gcm :: proc(ctx: ^Context_GCM, dst, tag, nonce, aad, plaintext: []byte) {
seal_gcm :: proc(ctx: ^Context_GCM, dst, tag, iv, aad, plaintext: []byte) {
assert(ctx._is_initialized)
gcm_validate_common_slice_sizes(tag, nonce, aad, plaintext)
gcm_validate_common_slice_sizes(tag, iv, aad, plaintext)
if len(dst) != len(plaintext) {
panic("crypto/aes: invalid destination ciphertext size")
}
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ seal_gcm :: proc(ctx: ^Context_GCM, dst, tag, nonce, aad, plaintext: []byte) {
}
if impl, is_hw := ctx._impl.(Context_Impl_Hardware); is_hw {
gcm_seal_hw(&impl, dst, tag, nonce, aad, plaintext)
gcm_seal_hw(&impl, dst, tag, iv, aad, plaintext)
return
}
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ seal_gcm :: proc(ctx: ^Context_GCM, dst, tag, nonce, aad, plaintext: []byte) {
j0: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
j0_enc: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
s: [_aes.GHASH_TAG_SIZE]byte
init_ghash_ct64(ctx, &h, &j0, &j0_enc, nonce)
init_ghash_ct64(ctx, &h, &j0, &j0_enc, iv)
// Note: Our GHASH implementation handles appending padding.
ct64.ghash(s[:], h[:], aad)
@@ -69,15 +69,15 @@ seal_gcm :: proc(ctx: ^Context_GCM, dst, tag, nonce, aad, plaintext: []byte) {
}
// open_gcm authenticates the aad and ciphertext, and decrypts the ciphertext,
// with the provided Context_GCM, nonce, and tag, and stores the output in dst,
// with the provided Context_GCM, iv, and tag, and stores the output in dst,
// returning true iff the authentication was successful. If authentication
// fails, the destination buffer will be zeroed.
//
// dst and plaintext MUST alias exactly or not at all.
open_gcm :: proc(ctx: ^Context_GCM, dst, nonce, aad, ciphertext, tag: []byte) -> bool {
open_gcm :: proc(ctx: ^Context_GCM, dst, iv, aad, ciphertext, tag: []byte) -> bool {
assert(ctx._is_initialized)
gcm_validate_common_slice_sizes(tag, nonce, aad, ciphertext)
gcm_validate_common_slice_sizes(tag, iv, aad, ciphertext)
if len(dst) != len(ciphertext) {
panic("crypto/aes: invalid destination plaintext size")
}
@@ -86,14 +86,14 @@ open_gcm :: proc(ctx: ^Context_GCM, dst, nonce, aad, ciphertext, tag: []byte) ->
}
if impl, is_hw := ctx._impl.(Context_Impl_Hardware); is_hw {
return gcm_open_hw(&impl, dst, nonce, aad, ciphertext, tag)
return gcm_open_hw(&impl, dst, iv, aad, ciphertext, tag)
}
h: [_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte
j0: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
j0_enc: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
s: [_aes.GHASH_TAG_SIZE]byte
init_ghash_ct64(ctx, &h, &j0, &j0_enc, nonce)
init_ghash_ct64(ctx, &h, &j0, &j0_enc, iv)
ct64.ghash(s[:], h[:], aad)
gctr_ct64(ctx, dst, &s, ciphertext, &h, &j0, false)
@@ -120,14 +120,14 @@ reset_gcm :: proc "contextless" (ctx: ^Context_GCM) {
}
@(private = "file")
gcm_validate_common_slice_sizes :: proc(tag, nonce, aad, text: []byte) {
gcm_validate_common_slice_sizes :: proc(tag, iv, aad, text: []byte) {
if len(tag) != GCM_TAG_SIZE {
panic("crypto/aes: invalid GCM tag size")
}
// The specification supports nonces in the range [1, 2^64) bits.
if l := len(nonce); l == 0 || u64(l) >= GCM_NONCE_SIZE_MAX {
panic("crypto/aes: invalid GCM nonce size")
// The specification supports IVs in the range [1, 2^64) bits.
if l := len(iv); l == 0 || u64(l) >= GCM_IV_SIZE_MAX {
panic("crypto/aes: invalid GCM IV size")
}
if aad_len := u64(len(aad)); aad_len > GCM_A_MAX {
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ init_ghash_ct64 :: proc(
h: ^[_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte,
j0: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte,
j0_enc: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte,
nonce: []byte,
iv: []byte,
) {
impl := &ctx._impl.(ct64.Context)
@@ -152,14 +152,14 @@ init_ghash_ct64 :: proc(
ct64.encrypt_block(impl, h[:], h[:])
// Define a block, J0, as follows:
if l := len(nonce); l == GCM_NONCE_SIZE {
if l := len(iv); l == GCM_IV_SIZE {
// if len(IV) = 96, then let J0 = IV || 0^31 || 1
copy(j0[:], nonce)
copy(j0[:], iv)
j0[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 1
} else {
// If len(IV) != 96, then let s = 128 ceil(len(IV)/128) - len(IV),
// and let J0 = GHASHH(IV || 0^(s+64) || ceil(len(IV))^64).
ct64.ghash(j0[:], h[:], nonce)
ct64.ghash(j0[:], h[:], iv)
tmp: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
endian.unchecked_put_u64be(tmp[8:], u64(l) * 8)
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ gctr_ct64 :: proc(
s: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte,
src: []byte,
h: ^[_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte,
nonce: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte,
iv: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte,
is_seal: bool,
) #no_bounds_check {
ct64_inc_ctr32 := #force_inline proc "contextless" (dst: []byte, ctr: u32) -> u32 {
@@ -208,14 +208,14 @@ gctr_ct64 :: proc(
// Setup the counter blocks.
tmp, tmp2: [ct64.STRIDE][BLOCK_SIZE]byte = ---, ---
ctrs, blks: [ct64.STRIDE][]byte = ---, ---
ctr := endian.unchecked_get_u32be(nonce[GCM_NONCE_SIZE:]) + 1
ctr := endian.unchecked_get_u32be(iv[GCM_IV_SIZE:]) + 1
for i in 0 ..< ct64.STRIDE {
// Setup scratch space for the keystream.
blks[i] = tmp2[i][:]
// Pre-copy the IV to all the counter blocks.
ctrs[i] = tmp[i][:]
copy(ctrs[i], nonce[:GCM_NONCE_SIZE])
copy(ctrs[i], iv[:GCM_IV_SIZE])
}
impl := &ctx._impl.(ct64.Context)
core/crypto/aes/aes_gcm_hw_intel.odin
+11 -11
View File
@@ -10,12 +10,12 @@ import "core:mem"
import "core:simd/x86"
@(private)
gcm_seal_hw :: proc(ctx: ^Context_Impl_Hardware, dst, tag, nonce, aad, plaintext: []byte) {
gcm_seal_hw :: proc(ctx: ^Context_Impl_Hardware, dst, tag, iv, aad, plaintext: []byte) {
h: [_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte
j0: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
j0_enc: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
s: [_aes.GHASH_TAG_SIZE]byte
init_ghash_hw(ctx, &h, &j0, &j0_enc, nonce)
init_ghash_hw(ctx, &h, &j0, &j0_enc, iv)
// Note: Our GHASH implementation handles appending padding.
hw_intel.ghash(s[:], h[:], aad)
@@ -29,12 +29,12 @@ gcm_seal_hw :: proc(ctx: ^Context_Impl_Hardware, dst, tag, nonce, aad, plaintext
}
@(private)
gcm_open_hw :: proc(ctx: ^Context_Impl_Hardware, dst, nonce, aad, ciphertext, tag: []byte) -> bool {
gcm_open_hw :: proc(ctx: ^Context_Impl_Hardware, dst, iv, aad, ciphertext, tag: []byte) -> bool {
h: [_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte
j0: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
j0_enc: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
s: [_aes.GHASH_TAG_SIZE]byte
init_ghash_hw(ctx, &h, &j0, &j0_enc, nonce)
init_ghash_hw(ctx, &h, &j0, &j0_enc, iv)
hw_intel.ghash(s[:], h[:], aad)
gctr_hw(ctx, dst, &s, ciphertext, &h, &j0, false)
@@ -59,20 +59,20 @@ init_ghash_hw :: proc(
h: ^[_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte,
j0: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte,
j0_enc: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte,
nonce: []byte,
iv: []byte,
) {
// 1. Let H = CIPH(k, 0^128)
encrypt_block_hw(ctx, h[:], h[:])
// Define a block, J0, as follows:
if l := len(nonce); l == GCM_NONCE_SIZE {
if l := len(iv); l == GCM_IV_SIZE {
// if len(IV) = 96, then let J0 = IV || 0^31 || 1
copy(j0[:], nonce)
copy(j0[:], iv)
j0[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 1
} else {
// If len(IV) != 96, then let s = 128 ceil(len(IV)/128) - len(IV),
// and let J0 = GHASHH(IV || 0^(s+64) || ceil(len(IV))^64).
hw_intel.ghash(j0[:], h[:], nonce)
hw_intel.ghash(j0[:], h[:], iv)
tmp: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
endian.unchecked_put_u64be(tmp[8:], u64(l) * 8)
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ gctr_hw :: proc(
s: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte,
src: []byte,
h: ^[_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte,
nonce: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte,
iv: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte,
is_seal: bool,
) #no_bounds_check {
sks: [15]x86.__m128i = ---
@@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ gctr_hw :: proc(
}
// Setup the counter block
ctr_blk := intrinsics.unaligned_load((^x86.__m128i)(nonce))
ctr := endian.unchecked_get_u32be(nonce[GCM_NONCE_SIZE:]) + 1
ctr_blk := intrinsics.unaligned_load((^x86.__m128i)(iv))
ctr := endian.unchecked_get_u32be(iv[GCM_IV_SIZE:]) + 1
src, dst := src, dst
core/crypto/aes/aes_impl_hw_gen.odin
+2 -2
View File
@@ -34,11 +34,11 @@ ctr_blocks_hw :: proc(ctx: ^Context_CTR, dst, src: []byte, nr_blocks: int) {
}
@(private)
gcm_seal_hw :: proc(ctx: ^Context_Impl_Hardware, dst, tag, nonce, aad, plaintext: []byte) {
gcm_seal_hw :: proc(ctx: ^Context_Impl_Hardware, dst, tag, iv, aad, plaintext: []byte) {
panic(ERR_HW_NOT_SUPPORTED)
}
@(private)
gcm_open_hw :: proc(ctx: ^Context_Impl_Hardware, dst, nonce, aad, ciphertext, tag: []byte) -> bool {
gcm_open_hw :: proc(ctx: ^Context_Impl_Hardware, dst, iv, aad, ciphertext, tag: []byte) -> bool {
panic(ERR_HW_NOT_SUPPORTED)
}
tests/core/crypto/test_core_crypto_aes.odin
+2 -2
View File
@@ -197,8 +197,8 @@ test_aes_ctr :: proc(t: ^testing.T, impl: aes.Implementation) {
ctx: aes.Context_CTR
key: [aes.KEY_SIZE_256]byte
nonce: [aes.CTR_IV_SIZE]byte
aes.init_ctr(&ctx, key[:], nonce[:], impl)
iv: [aes.CTR_IV_SIZE]byte
aes.init_ctr(&ctx, key[:], iv[:], impl)
h_ctx: sha2.Context_512
sha2.init_512_256(&h_ctx)