core/crypto/aes: Support the full range of GCM nonce sizes

This commit is contained in:
Yawning Angel
2024-07-16 01:29:43 +09:00
parent 69026852ce
commit 33dae2e26c
2 changed files with 67 additions and 43 deletions
+36 -24
View File
@@ -7,8 +7,10 @@ import "core:crypto/_aes/ct64"
import "core:encoding/endian" import "core:encoding/endian"
import "core:mem" import "core:mem"
// GCM_NONCE_SIZE is the size of the GCM nonce in bytes. // GCM_NONCE_SIZE is the default size of the GCM nonce in bytes.
GCM_NONCE_SIZE :: 12 GCM_NONCE_SIZE :: 12
// GCM_NONCE_SIZE_MAX is the maximum size of the GCM nonce in bytes.
GCM_NONCE_SIZE_MAX :: 0x2000000000000000 // floor((2^64 - 1) / 8) bits
// GCM_TAG_SIZE is the size of a GCM tag in bytes. // GCM_TAG_SIZE is the size of a GCM tag in bytes.
GCM_TAG_SIZE :: _aes.GHASH_TAG_SIZE GCM_TAG_SIZE :: _aes.GHASH_TAG_SIZE
@@ -51,17 +53,19 @@ seal_gcm :: proc(ctx: ^Context_GCM, dst, tag, nonce, aad, plaintext: []byte) {
h: [_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte h: [_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte
j0: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte j0: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
j0_enc: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
s: [_aes.GHASH_TAG_SIZE]byte s: [_aes.GHASH_TAG_SIZE]byte
init_ghash_ct64(ctx, &h, &j0, nonce) init_ghash_ct64(ctx, &h, &j0, &j0_enc, nonce)
// Note: Our GHASH implementation handles appending padding. // Note: Our GHASH implementation handles appending padding.
ct64.ghash(s[:], h[:], aad) ct64.ghash(s[:], h[:], aad)
gctr_ct64(ctx, dst, &s, plaintext, &h, nonce, true) gctr_ct64(ctx, dst, &s, plaintext, &h, &j0, true)
final_ghash_ct64(&s, &h, &j0, len(aad), len(plaintext)) final_ghash_ct64(&s, &h, &j0_enc, len(aad), len(plaintext))
copy(tag, s[:]) copy(tag, s[:])
mem.zero_explicit(&h, len(h)) mem.zero_explicit(&h, len(h))
mem.zero_explicit(&j0, len(j0)) mem.zero_explicit(&j0, len(j0))
mem.zero_explicit(&j0_enc, len(j0_enc))
} }
// open_gcm authenticates the aad and ciphertext, and decrypts the ciphertext, // open_gcm authenticates the aad and ciphertext, and decrypts the ciphertext,
@@ -87,12 +91,13 @@ open_gcm :: proc(ctx: ^Context_GCM, dst, nonce, aad, ciphertext, tag: []byte) ->
h: [_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte h: [_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte
j0: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte j0: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
j0_enc: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
s: [_aes.GHASH_TAG_SIZE]byte s: [_aes.GHASH_TAG_SIZE]byte
init_ghash_ct64(ctx, &h, &j0, nonce) init_ghash_ct64(ctx, &h, &j0, &j0_enc, nonce)
ct64.ghash(s[:], h[:], aad) ct64.ghash(s[:], h[:], aad)
gctr_ct64(ctx, dst, &s, ciphertext, &h, nonce, false) gctr_ct64(ctx, dst, &s, ciphertext, &h, &j0, false)
final_ghash_ct64(&s, &h, &j0, len(aad), len(ciphertext)) final_ghash_ct64(&s, &h, &j0_enc, len(aad), len(ciphertext))
ok := crypto.compare_constant_time(s[:], tag) == 1 ok := crypto.compare_constant_time(s[:], tag) == 1
if !ok { if !ok {
@@ -101,6 +106,7 @@ open_gcm :: proc(ctx: ^Context_GCM, dst, nonce, aad, ciphertext, tag: []byte) ->
mem.zero_explicit(&h, len(h)) mem.zero_explicit(&h, len(h))
mem.zero_explicit(&j0, len(j0)) mem.zero_explicit(&j0, len(j0))
mem.zero_explicit(&j0_enc, len(j0_enc))
mem.zero_explicit(&s, len(s)) mem.zero_explicit(&s, len(s))
return ok return ok
@@ -119,13 +125,8 @@ gcm_validate_common_slice_sizes :: proc(tag, nonce, aad, text: []byte) {
panic("crypto/aes: invalid GCM tag size") panic("crypto/aes: invalid GCM tag size")
} }
// The specification supports nonces in the range [1, 2^64) bits // The specification supports nonces in the range [1, 2^64) bits.
// however per NIST SP 800-38D 5.2.1.1: if l := len(nonce); l == 0 || u64(l) >= GCM_NONCE_SIZE_MAX {
//
// > For IVs, it is recommended that implementations restrict support
// > to the length of 96 bits, to promote interoperability, efficiency,
// > and simplicity of design.
if len(nonce) != GCM_NONCE_SIZE {
panic("crypto/aes: invalid GCM nonce size") panic("crypto/aes: invalid GCM nonce size")
} }
@@ -142,6 +143,7 @@ init_ghash_ct64 :: proc(
ctx: ^Context_GCM, ctx: ^Context_GCM,
h: ^[_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte, h: ^[_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte,
j0: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte, j0: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte,
j0_enc: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte,
nonce: []byte, nonce: []byte,
) { ) {
impl := &ctx._impl.(ct64.Context) impl := &ctx._impl.(ct64.Context)
@@ -149,12 +151,25 @@ init_ghash_ct64 :: proc(
// 1. Let H = CIPH(k, 0^128) // 1. Let H = CIPH(k, 0^128)
ct64.encrypt_block(impl, h[:], h[:]) ct64.encrypt_block(impl, h[:], h[:])
// Define a block, J0, as follows:
if l := len(nonce); l == GCM_NONCE_SIZE {
// if len(IV) = 96, then let J0 = IV || 0^31 || 1
copy(j0[:], nonce)
j0[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 1
} else {
// If len(IV) != 96, then let s = 128 ceil(len(IV)/128) - len(IV),
// and let J0 = GHASHH(IV || 0^(s+64) || ceil(len(IV))^64).
ct64.ghash(j0[:], h[:], nonce)
tmp: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
endian.unchecked_put_u64be(tmp[8:], u64(l) * 8)
ct64.ghash(j0[:], h[:], tmp[:])
}
// ECB encrypt j0, so that we can just XOR with the tag. In theory // ECB encrypt j0, so that we can just XOR with the tag. In theory
// this could be processed along with the final GCTR block, to // this could be processed along with the final GCTR block, to
// potentially save a call to AES-ECB, but... just use AES-NI. // potentially save a call to AES-ECB, but... just use AES-NI.
copy(j0[:], nonce) ct64.encrypt_block(impl, j0_enc[:], j0[:])
j0[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 1
ct64.encrypt_block(impl, j0[:], j0[:])
} }
@(private = "file") @(private = "file")
@@ -182,7 +197,7 @@ gctr_ct64 :: proc(
s: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte, s: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte,
src: []byte, src: []byte,
h: ^[_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte, h: ^[_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte,
nonce: []byte, nonce: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte,
is_seal: bool, is_seal: bool,
) #no_bounds_check { ) #no_bounds_check {
ct64_inc_ctr32 := #force_inline proc "contextless" (dst: []byte, ctr: u32) -> u32 { ct64_inc_ctr32 := #force_inline proc "contextless" (dst: []byte, ctr: u32) -> u32 {
@@ -190,20 +205,17 @@ gctr_ct64 :: proc(
return ctr + 1 return ctr + 1
} }
// 2. Define a block J_0 as follows: // Setup the counter blocks.
// if len(IV) = 96, then let J0 = IV || 0^31 || 1
//
// Note: We only support 96 bit IVs.
tmp, tmp2: [ct64.STRIDE][BLOCK_SIZE]byte = ---, --- tmp, tmp2: [ct64.STRIDE][BLOCK_SIZE]byte = ---, ---
ctrs, blks: [ct64.STRIDE][]byte = ---, --- ctrs, blks: [ct64.STRIDE][]byte = ---, ---
ctr: u32 = 2 ctr := endian.unchecked_get_u32be(nonce[GCM_NONCE_SIZE:]) + 1
for i in 0 ..< ct64.STRIDE { for i in 0 ..< ct64.STRIDE {
// Setup scratch space for the keystream. // Setup scratch space for the keystream.
blks[i] = tmp2[i][:] blks[i] = tmp2[i][:]
// Pre-copy the IV to all the counter blocks. // Pre-copy the IV to all the counter blocks.
ctrs[i] = tmp[i][:] ctrs[i] = tmp[i][:]
copy(ctrs[i], nonce) copy(ctrs[i], nonce[:GCM_NONCE_SIZE])
} }
impl := &ctx._impl.(ct64.Context) impl := &ctx._impl.(ct64.Context)
+30 -18
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@@ -13,29 +13,32 @@ import "core:simd/x86"
gcm_seal_hw :: proc(ctx: ^Context_Impl_Hardware, dst, tag, nonce, aad, plaintext: []byte) { gcm_seal_hw :: proc(ctx: ^Context_Impl_Hardware, dst, tag, nonce, aad, plaintext: []byte) {
h: [_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte h: [_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte
j0: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte j0: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
j0_enc: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
s: [_aes.GHASH_TAG_SIZE]byte s: [_aes.GHASH_TAG_SIZE]byte
init_ghash_hw(ctx, &h, &j0, nonce) init_ghash_hw(ctx, &h, &j0, &j0_enc, nonce)
// Note: Our GHASH implementation handles appending padding. // Note: Our GHASH implementation handles appending padding.
hw_intel.ghash(s[:], h[:], aad) hw_intel.ghash(s[:], h[:], aad)
gctr_hw(ctx, dst, &s, plaintext, &h, nonce, true) gctr_hw(ctx, dst, &s, plaintext, &h, &j0, true)
final_ghash_hw(&s, &h, &j0, len(aad), len(plaintext)) final_ghash_hw(&s, &h, &j0_enc, len(aad), len(plaintext))
copy(tag, s[:]) copy(tag, s[:])
mem.zero_explicit(&h, len(h)) mem.zero_explicit(&h, len(h))
mem.zero_explicit(&j0, len(j0)) mem.zero_explicit(&j0, len(j0))
mem.zero_explicit(&j0_enc, len(j0_enc))
} }
@(private) @(private)
gcm_open_hw :: proc(ctx: ^Context_Impl_Hardware, dst, nonce, aad, ciphertext, tag: []byte) -> bool { gcm_open_hw :: proc(ctx: ^Context_Impl_Hardware, dst, nonce, aad, ciphertext, tag: []byte) -> bool {
h: [_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte h: [_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte
j0: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte j0: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
j0_enc: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
s: [_aes.GHASH_TAG_SIZE]byte s: [_aes.GHASH_TAG_SIZE]byte
init_ghash_hw(ctx, &h, &j0, nonce) init_ghash_hw(ctx, &h, &j0, &j0_enc, nonce)
hw_intel.ghash(s[:], h[:], aad) hw_intel.ghash(s[:], h[:], aad)
gctr_hw(ctx, dst, &s, ciphertext, &h, nonce, false) gctr_hw(ctx, dst, &s, ciphertext, &h, &j0, false)
final_ghash_hw(&s, &h, &j0, len(aad), len(ciphertext)) final_ghash_hw(&s, &h, &j0_enc, len(aad), len(ciphertext))
ok := crypto.compare_constant_time(s[:], tag) == 1 ok := crypto.compare_constant_time(s[:], tag) == 1
if !ok { if !ok {
@@ -44,6 +47,7 @@ gcm_open_hw :: proc(ctx: ^Context_Impl_Hardware, dst, nonce, aad, ciphertext, ta
mem.zero_explicit(&h, len(h)) mem.zero_explicit(&h, len(h))
mem.zero_explicit(&j0, len(j0)) mem.zero_explicit(&j0, len(j0))
mem.zero_explicit(&j0_enc, len(j0_enc))
mem.zero_explicit(&s, len(s)) mem.zero_explicit(&s, len(s))
return ok return ok
@@ -54,15 +58,29 @@ init_ghash_hw :: proc(
ctx: ^Context_Impl_Hardware, ctx: ^Context_Impl_Hardware,
h: ^[_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte, h: ^[_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte,
j0: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte, j0: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte,
j0_enc: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte,
nonce: []byte, nonce: []byte,
) { ) {
// 1. Let H = CIPH(k, 0^128) // 1. Let H = CIPH(k, 0^128)
encrypt_block_hw(ctx, h[:], h[:]) encrypt_block_hw(ctx, h[:], h[:])
// ECB encrypt j0, so that we can just XOR with the tag. // Define a block, J0, as follows:
if l := len(nonce); l == GCM_NONCE_SIZE {
// if len(IV) = 96, then let J0 = IV || 0^31 || 1
copy(j0[:], nonce) copy(j0[:], nonce)
j0[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 1 j0[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 1
encrypt_block_hw(ctx, j0[:], j0[:]) } else {
// If len(IV) != 96, then let s = 128 ceil(len(IV)/128) - len(IV),
// and let J0 = GHASHH(IV || 0^(s+64) || ceil(len(IV))^64).
hw_intel.ghash(j0[:], h[:], nonce)
tmp: [_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte
endian.unchecked_put_u64be(tmp[8:], u64(l) * 8)
hw_intel.ghash(j0[:], h[:], tmp[:])
}
// ECB encrypt j0, so that we can just XOR with the tag.
encrypt_block_hw(ctx, j0_enc[:], j0[:])
} }
@(private = "file", enable_target_feature = "sse2") @(private = "file", enable_target_feature = "sse2")
@@ -91,7 +109,7 @@ gctr_hw :: proc(
s: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte, s: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte,
src: []byte, src: []byte,
h: ^[_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte, h: ^[_aes.GHASH_KEY_SIZE]byte,
nonce: []byte, nonce: ^[_aes.GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]byte,
is_seal: bool, is_seal: bool,
) #no_bounds_check { ) #no_bounds_check {
sks: [15]x86.__m128i = --- sks: [15]x86.__m128i = ---
@@ -99,15 +117,9 @@ gctr_hw :: proc(
sks[i] = intrinsics.unaligned_load((^x86.__m128i)(&ctx._sk_exp_enc[i])) sks[i] = intrinsics.unaligned_load((^x86.__m128i)(&ctx._sk_exp_enc[i]))
} }
// 2. Define a block J_0 as follows: // Setup the counter block
// if len(IV) = 96, then let J0 = IV || 0^31 || 1 ctr_blk := intrinsics.unaligned_load((^x86.__m128i)(nonce))
// ctr := endian.unchecked_get_u32be(nonce[GCM_NONCE_SIZE:]) + 1
// Note: We only support 96 bit IVs.
tmp: [BLOCK_SIZE]byte
ctr_blk: x86.__m128i
copy(tmp[:], nonce)
ctr_blk = intrinsics.unaligned_load((^x86.__m128i)(&tmp))
ctr: u32 = 2
src, dst := src, dst src, dst := src, dst